# Draft Bill — Arizona Pretrial Self-Defense Immunity Act

**Status:** Concept draft for discussion/advocacy purposes only. Not introduced legislation. Section numbering, drafting conventions, and cross-references should be verified against the current Arizona Revised Statutes and reviewed by Legislative Council or an attorney before being submitted to a legislator.

**Placement:** Title 13, Chapter 4 (Justification) currently runs through § 13-419 (residential-structure presumptions). This draft is written as new **§ 13-420**, the next open section number in that chapter as of this draft. Confirm against the live ARS before filing, since numbering can shift as other bills are enacted.


## AN ACT

AMENDING TITLE 13, CHAPTER 4, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, BY ADDING SECTION 13-420; RELATING TO JUSTIFICATION.

**Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona:**

### Section 1. Legislative findings and purpose

The legislature finds that a person who lawfully acts in self-defense, defense of a third person, defense of premises, or crime prevention under chapter 4 of this title should not be forced to bear the full expense, disruption, and risk of a criminal trial or civil lawsuit before that justification can be determined. The purpose of this act is to establish a pretrial procedure, in addition to the rights already provided under sections 13-205, 13-404, 13-405, 13-406, 13-407, 13-408, 13-411, 13-413, 13-418 and 13-419 of this title, by which a court may resolve a properly supported claim of justification before trial.

### Section 2. Section 13-420, Arizona Revised Statutes, is added to read:

**13-420. Justification; pretrial immunity from criminal prosecution and civil action; motion to dismiss; burden of proof**

A. A person who threatens or uses physical force or deadly physical force as justified under section 13-404, 13-405, 13-406, 13-407, 13-408, 13-411, 13-418 or 13-419 is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the threatened or actual use of that force, except as provided in subsection G of this section.

B. As used in this section, "criminal prosecution" includes arresting, detaining in custody, charging and prosecuting the defendant.

C. A defendant may move the court, before trial, to dismiss the charges on the ground that the defendant is immune from prosecution under subsection A. The filing of the motion, together with any evidence — including the defendant's own affidavit, testimony or other evidence — that the defendant's threatened or actual use of force was justified under chapter 4 of this title, constitutes a prima facie claim of immunity.

D. On the filing of a prima facie claim under subsection C, the court shall hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the burden shifts to the state, which must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's threatened or actual use of force was not justified in order to overcome the defendant's immunity under subsection A. The Arizona rules of evidence apply to the hearing.

E. If the state does not meet its burden under subsection D, the court shall grant the motion, dismiss the charges with prejudice, and enter a written finding that the defendant is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the conduct at issue. If the state meets its burden, the case proceeds to trial in the ordinary course, and this section does not affect the burden of proof at trial under section 13-205.

F. An order denying a motion under this section is subject to immediate review by special action under the Arizona rules of procedure for special actions, and trial court proceedings are stayed pending that review unless the reviewing court orders otherwise.

G. This section does not apply to a person who:

1. Was attempting to commit, committing or fleeing after the commission of a serious offense as defined in section 13-706; or

2. Initially provoked the use or threatened use of force against himself or herself, except as and to the extent provided in section 13-404, subsection B; or

3. Used or threatened to use force against a law enforcement officer who the person knew, or reasonably should have known, was a law enforcement officer acting within the scope of the officer's official duties.

H. A defendant who obtains a dismissal under subsection E, or who otherwise prevails on a claim of immunity under this section in a civil action, is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, court costs, compensation for loss of income and all other reasonable expenses incurred in the defendant's defense from the party bringing the criminal charge or civil action, consistent with section 13-413.

I. This section does not repeal, replace or limit any defense, presumption or immunity available under this chapter. It establishes an additional pretrial procedure only.

### Section 3. Severability

If a provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.


## Notes on the drafting choices

- **Subsection D** is the core ask: it copies Florida's post-2017 § 776.032(4) structure — prima facie showing by the defendant, then the state must disprove justification by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing before trial. That's a meaningfully higher bar for the state than the "probable cause" standard Kansas and Kentucky courts settled on, or the preponderance-on-the-defendant standard used in Alabama and South Carolina.

- **Subsection E** deliberately preserves § 13-205 (Arizona's existing beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard at trial) so this doesn't accidentally lower the state's burden if the case does go to trial — it only adds an earlier off-ramp.

- **Subsection F** uses Arizona's actual procedural vehicle (special action) rather than importing Florida's writ-of-prohibition language, since Arizona replaced the old prerogative writs with special actions.

- **Subsection H** borrows Florida's fee-shifting language, which functions like Texas's and South Carolina's civil fee-shifting — it raises the cost of bringing a losing case against someone who was legitimately acting in self-defense.

